We review the literature on wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible bond and warrant-bond offerings. The findings of 35 event studies, which include 84 sub-samples and 6,310 announcements, are analysed using meta-analysis. We find a mean cumulative abnormal return of -1.14% for convertibles compared with -0.02% for warrant-bonds, the significant difference confirming a relative advantage for warrantbonds. Abnormal returns for hybrid securities issued in the United States are significantly more negative than those issued in other countries. In addition, issuing hybrid securities to refund debt does not seem to be favoured by investors. Finally, several factors identified as important by theory or in prior research are not significant within our cross-study models, suggesting that more evidence is needed to confirm whether they are robust.
I. Introduction
Companies can attract financing from different sources: they can issue equity in the form of shares of common stock or they can choose to attract debt. Another possibility is to attract a form of capital between equity and debt. The best-known alternatives in this area are issues of convertible bond and warrant-bond offerings. A convertible bond is a hybrid security that combines characteristics of bonds and equity. Convertible bondholders receive income from the bonds in the form of a coupon. In addition they have the right to convert the bonds into a specific number of common stocks within a specific period.
Warrant-bond issues are a combination of straight bonds and separate warrants. Past empirical studies on warrant-bond and convertible bond issues find that convertible bond offerings are associated with negative abnormal returns. The verdict on warrant-bond issues in such studies is not completely clear: some studies find that warrant-bonds are also associated with negative abnormal returns, others conclude that warrant-bond offerings are a "penalty-free issuance of an equity-like security" (Billingsley, Lamy, and Smith 1990) .
In this context it is remarkable that we have not seen a resurgence of the market for warrant-bond issues. Another observation from previous empirical studies is that studies on the US market, from now on US studies, have systematically shown negative abnormal returns associated with convertible bond issues, while studies from other countries, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Netherlands, sometimes show positive returns. If this is a consistent picture, it is remarkable that the resurgence of convertibles has taken place within the US.
A number of papers have presented overviews of past literature on announcement effects associated with the issuance of securities. For example, Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) overview a large number of studies that calculate shareholder wealth effects associated with offerings of stocks, straight debt, and convertible debt. In a similar fashion, Loncarski, Ter Horst, and Veld (2006) present an overview table of studies on announcement effects associated with convertible bonds. The current study contributes to these previous studies by not only presenting an overview table, but by also using a specific type of metaanalysis, generally referred to as replication analysis, in which we conduct a regression analysis that summarizes a wide range of existing studies. This meta-analysis will show whether convertible bonds are associated with different abnormal returns than warrantbonds. It will also show whether there are any systematic country differences or differences associated with specific issuer characteristics.
We find 35 papers that report results on announcement effects of convertible bonds and/or warrant-bond issues. These papers include a total of 6,310 announcements within 84 subsample results. These sub-sample results are analysed using meta-analysis in line with previous studies such as Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan (1992) and Veld and VeldMerkoulova (2009) .
We find a significantly negative mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -1.14% for announcements of convertibles compared with -0.02% for warrant-bonds; the difference in means is statistically significant, confirming a relative advantage for warrant-bonds. In addition we find that US studies show significantly larger negative abnormal returns than studies outside the US, including those on market-oriented countries (such as the UK, Canada, and Australia); the difference is between -1.1% and -1.5%, on average. Also, issuing hybrid securities to refund debt does not seem to be favoured by investors. Finally, several factors identified as important by theory or in prior research are not significant within our cross-study models, suggesting that more evidence is needed to confirm whether they are robust.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the studies on the wealth effects that are associated with announcements of convertible bond and warrant-bond offerings. Section 3 includes a discussion of the factors that have the potential to explain these wealth effects. The model for the meta-analysis is included in Section 4. Section 5 describes the results, and the paper is concluded in Section 6 with a discussion of the implications of the results.
Wealth effects of convertible bond and warrant-bond offerings
An extensive set of event studies on announcements of convertible bonds and bonds issued together with warrants have been undertaken. All these studies document abnormal returns associated with the announcement. We review these studies by using a meta-analysis technique. We follow the approach of Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan (1992) [Please insert Table 1 here]
The results of these studies vary. The studies on the announcement effects of convertible bonds in Japan reveal significantly positive market reactions in one study (Kang and Stulz 1996) , but a significantly negative reaction in two studies (Mollemans 2002; Cheng, Visaltanachoti, and Kesayan 2005) as well as non-significant reactions in two studies (Kang, Kim, Park, and Stulz 1995; Christensen, Faria, Kwok, and Bremer 1996) 
The difference between convertible bonds and warrant-bonds
Convertible bond issues and warrant-bond issues are both a combination of a straight bond and a warrant that allows the holder to purchase the underlying common stock. An important difference is the fact that a warrant in a warrant-bond issue can usually be detached from the bond either at the issuance date or very shortly thereafter. This detachability gives an advantage to warrant-bond buyers, since they can separately trade the warrant and the bonds. The detachability also gives the issuing company the option to set a different maturity for the warrant than for the bond. For convertible bond issues the maturity has to be the same because the bond disappears when the conversion right is exercised. This gives an advantage to the issuer of warrant-bond issues compared to convertible bond issues. On the other hand, a disadvantage of warrant-bond offers from the perspective of the issuer is that bondholders and warrant holders are not necessarily the same person or institution. Therefore, unlike convertibles, warrant-bonds cannot be forced into conversion by calling them, which is a disadvantage if firms want to obtain equity through the backdoor.
A number of studies investigate both convertible bond issues and warrant-bond issues and find different wealth effects in response to announcements to raise capital using these securities. However, the empirical evidence is not robust on this issue. Billingsley et al. (1990) document that the announcements of warrant-bond issues are associated with less negative abnormal returns than convertible debt. This finding is supported by De Roon and Veld (1998 ), Gebhardt, (2001 , and Kang et al. (1995) in different markets. In contrast, Christensen et al. (1996) , and Kang and Stulz (1996) find more negative abnormal returns for the announcements of warrant-bond issues than for convertible bond issues.
Equity-versus debt-likeness
Firms can design a convertible bond by specifying security characteristics, such as coupon rate, maturity date, conversion ratio, and others. For example, convertible bonds that have a longer maturity and a lower coupon rate can be categorized as equity-like convertible bonds. Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003) use the conversion probability as a guideline to sort convertible bonds into three groups. If the probability of conversion into equity is less than 40% the convertible bonds are considered as 'debt-like', between 40% and 60% as 'hedge-like', and greater than 60% as 'equity-like'. They find almost identical negative market reactions, of just over -1%, to announcements for the three groups. Suchard (2007) also finds similar (non-significant) negative returns for announcements of debt-like and equity-like convertibles in the Australian market. On the other hand, Loncarski, Ter Horst, and Veld (2008) find that equity-like convertible bonds are associated with a negative 3-day abnormal return of -3.7%, which is significantly higher than the -0.1% abnormal return for the announcement of debt-like convertibles. For the French market, Burlacu (2000) argues that equity-like convertible bonds have more negative market reactions associated with their announcements but the results appear less clear-cut.
Differences in corporate governance systems
Since our meta-analysis incorporates studies from around the world, it is necessary to take into account country specific characteristics. Moerland (1995) France, and Belgium), and Japan.
It is possible that differences in corporate governance systems may contribute to different results. De Roon and Veld (1998) argue that a difference in corporate governance is not responsible for differences in abnormal returns between Dutch and US convertible bond and warrant-bond offerings. Kang et al. (1995) find positive abnormal returns for Japan in response to announcements of warrant-bond issues. They suggest that this may reflect the different financial system during the study period, whereby equity-linked issues are guaranteed by a bank which conveys positive news to investors. In this meta-analysis, we have 22 market-oriented studies and 13 network-oriented studies. Our meta-analysis will investigate whether differences in corporate governance systems are responsible for differences in abnormal returns. 
Rights offering
Convertible bonds are sometimes issued in the form of a rights offering. Rights offerings are a puzzle in equity issues. In the United States most companies prefer firm-commitment offerings over rights offerings even though firm commitment offerings are associated with lower abnormal returns (see e.g. Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Kothare, 1997) . Unlike US firms, British firms prefer the use of open offers and placings for their seasoned equity offerings over the use of rights offers (Armitage, 2010) . A placing is the UK equivalent of a firm commitment offering. Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000) define a placing as a form of public offering in which an underwriter purchases new securities offered by the issuing firm at the stated price. The underwriter then sells the shares to institutional investors and other outside shareholders without a commission. The preference for placings over rights issues is confirmed in a number of empirical studies that find higher abnormal returns for placings than for rights issues in both the UK and Australia.
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For convertible bonds, Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) find an abnormal return associated with placing announcements of -1.51% compared with -0.95% for rights issues (both significant at the 1%-level). For open offers they find an abnormal return of -8.27% (but based on a very small sample of four announcements). These results are remarkable given that, for UK equity issues, rights issues are associated with more negative abnormal returns Eckbo, 1986 ).
Stated reasons for offering
There are various reasons why corporations need financing, including to finance capital expenditures, new investments, growth of the company, general funding, or to refinance debt. According to Myers and Majluf (1984) issuing securities for investment opportunities sends a negative signal to the market. In contrast, the sequential financing hypothesis of Mayers (1998) suggests that convertible bonds reduce the issuance costs and also present a solution for the free-cash flow problem. With forced conversion firms can use the funds to take-up positive net present value projects or to fund capital investment. With regard to issuance of securities to refund debt, Ross (1977) argues that a debt increase signals that the firm is confident about its future earnings potential. Vice versa, a debt refund signals bad news (see also Mikkelson and Partch, 1986) .
Studies by Eckbo (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) reveal that issuing convertible debt for refunding existing debt, to finance capital expenditures, and general refunding is associated with significantly negative abnormal returns. Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) find a positive abnormal return of 1.08% (significant at the 5%-level) to announcements of convertible bonds that are used to pay for capital expenditure but a negative abnormal return of -2.9% (significant at the 10%-level) for debt refinancing. Stein (1992, p. 17) suggests that 'the greater is the potential for costly distress (i.e., the lower the bond rating) the more credible is the convertible as a signal of optimism'. This statement implies that a firm with a lower rating bond, which uses a convertible bond as a method of financing, is optimistic enough that it will be able to force conversion and will eventually not be left with an additional debt burden. Therefore Stein (1992) argues that the issuance of a convertible bond should be considered as good news and should be treated with a less negative announcement effect compared to an equity issue of the same size by the same firm.
Rating of convertible bonds
Empirical studies by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , Jen, Choi, and Lee (1997) , and Kang and Stulz (1996) find results that are consistent with the theory of Stein (1992) . However, Eckbo (1986) documents contradictory results in the sense that convertible bonds with high Moody's ratings (Aaa-Aa and A) have non-significantly negative abnormal returns while convertible bonds with a low rating (Baa-Caa) have significantly negative abnormal returns during the announcements of these securities. In order to test Stein's theory we compare abnormal returns between convertible bonds with different ratings in the metaanalysis.
Size of the firm
Some studies use firm size as a measure of asymmetric information, arguing that small firms tend to have higher asymmetric information compared to large firms. Larger firms such as listed firms have an obligation to release certain information to public, while small firms have a tendency and greater opportunity to keep information private. The greater the degree of information release by firms, the smaller the expected absolute level of market reaction to security issue announcements. Kang and Stulz (1996) report mean abnormal returns of +2.7% and +2.9% for convertible bond announcements of large and small Japanese firms, respectively, with the difference not being significant. Similarly De Roon and Veld (1998) found no significant difference between large and small firm abnormal returns in the Netherlands for convertibles or for warrant-bonds. However, Gebhardt (2001) reports a positive abnormal return (+0.57%) for large German companies that announce issues of warrant-bonds, but this is significantly lower than for small companies (+3.12%). All 3 studies adopt event windows of more than two days when analysing firm size effects so cannot be included within the two day event window meta-analysis here. Smith (1986) notes that utilities tend to issue more external capital than industrial companies. For this reason, the stock price reaction associated with security issues by utilities can be expected to be less negative compared to those of industrial companies.
Industrial versus non-industrial companies
Janjigian ( 
Publication Bias
We collect articles from various sources including working papers and articles in topranked finance journals. Therefore, there is a possibility that we are facing a publication bias. We include two dummy variables to investigate publication bias (after Veld and 
Methods

Meta-analysis
We use meta-analysis to review studies on wealth effects of the announcement of convertible bond and warrant-bond issues. Meta-analysis is an alternative to narrative literature review and can be defined as (Green and Hall, 1984, pp. 37-38) :
'….the use of quantitative methods to summarize and analyze research literature…..which treats the study as the unit of analysis and is entirely based on quantitatively expressed study attributes and outcomes'
One of the advantages of using meta-analysis is that we can derive statistically strong conclusions from the collected empirical evidence. In addition, meta-analysis provides more objective results compared to traditional literature reviews. Scholars also highlight advantages of meta-analysis include stressing gaps in the literature, offering new guidelines for research, and identifying ambiguous relationships among variables (Wolf, 1986) . While theories may be valid within-sample when tested within the original studies, the evidence may not be sufficiently convincing in the between-sample tests employed in a meta-analysis. This would suggest the possibility that some prior results may be samplespecific and argues for study replication across different environments and time-periods.
Model
Wealth effects are typically measured using the 'event study' method that analyses stock price reactions associated with announcements of unpredictable events. Event study procedures include estimating abnormal returns using either mean adjusted returns, market adjusted returns, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) returns, matched or control portfolio returns, and market model returns. Basically, unpredictable events will lead to three possibilities: positive abnormal returns, negative abnormal returns, and neutral or zero abnormal returns. If the unpredictable event leads to a positive abnormal return, we can state that the event creates value to shareholders or increases shareholders wealth and if the unpredictable event leads to a negative abnormal return, we can state that the event destroys value for shareholders, or decreases shareholders wealth.
In this paper we use a form of meta-analysis that is generally referred to as replication analysis. In this form of meta-analysis the abnormal returns from previous studies are used as observations in a multi-factor natural experiment, with the experimental factors corresponding to the factors hypothesized to influence wealth creation (Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan, 1992, p. 71) . The dependent variable is the abnormal return, which is an estimate of the wealth created. Multiple regression analysis is used to assess the impact of each factor on the dependent variable. As is common in meta-analysis the factor levels are based on data available in previous studies. 
Equity-versus debt-likeness
Equity-like s = issue is defined in the original paper as equity-like (1 = Yes); Mixed-like s = issue is defined in the original paper as mixed-like or is not identified
(1 = Yes); 8 7 A problem with our analysis is that we treat the choice between CBs and WBs as exogenous. If unobservable factors determining the decision to issue convertibles versus warrant-bonds also influence stock price reactions to these offerings' announcements, then the dummy variable capturing CB versus WB will be biased. Ideally we would like to use a two-step Heckman (1979) procedure to verify whether our results are robust for controlling for endogeneity of the choice between hybrid instruments. Unfortunately, this procedure is not possible for us since we don't have access to the data used in the original individual analyses. 8 The definition of equity-like, debt-like, and mixed-like is not the same in each paper. Burlacu (2000) uses the factor N(d 1 ) (delta) from the Black-Scholes model and defines convertibles with a delta between 0 and 0.33 as debt-like, between 0.33 and 0.66 as mixed-like, and between 0.66 and 1 as equity-like. Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003) us the factor N(d 2 ) from the Black-Scholes model (probability of conversion) and define a bond as debt-like if the probability is less than 40%, as mixed-like (called hedge-like in their paper) if the probability is between 40% and 60%, and as equity-like if the probability is higher than 60%. Suchard (2007) uses the same probability of conversion as Lewis et al. (2003) , but defines convertibles with
The omitted dummy here is Debt-like enabling direct comparison with Equity-like
Differences in corporate governance systems
Non-US Market s = market-oriented economy other than US (UK, Canada, and Australia) (1 = Yes);
United States s = study on the United States (1 = Yes);
The omitted dummy here is study on a network-oriented country Rights s = rights offering (1 = Yes); 0 = any other issue mechanism
Reasons for offering
Refund s = funds are used for refunding old debt (1 = Yes);
Capital Expenditure s = funds are attracted for capital expenditure (1 = Yes);
The omitted dummy here is any other reason for offering or unknown reason, including both non-disclosure by issuer or not investigated in original study
Rating ( working papers a probability less than 0.5 as debt-like and higher than 0.5 as equity-like. Loncarski, Ter Horst, and Veld (2008) use the delta and define convertibles with a delta lower than 0.5 as debt-like and higher than 0.5 as equity-like. Most studies do not distinguish between equity-like and debt-like and are therefore treated as 'mixed-like'. 9 The papers that present separate results for large and small firms all divide the total sample in two equal parts: the largest half of the firms are labelled as large firms and the smallest half of the firms are classified as small firms. Kang and Stulz (1996) define firm size as the market value of equity. De Roon and Veld (1998) define firm size as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt.
Results of the meta-analysis
The 35 studies summarized in Table 1 provide the data for the meta-analysis. In our main models we use all sub-samples that report a mean CAR for a two-day event window
(typically day -1 to day 0, but depends on announcement day definition) around the hybrid security announcement. To achieve greater study coverage, and provide robustness checks, we also estimate models incorporating studies that report short-run mean CARs over event window periods other than two-days. While we use the closest period to two days, the inclusion of different periods within the dependent variable is a limitation of these models. 10 Many of the 35 studies present separate subsamples involving analysis of at least one of the variables mentioned in Section 3, leading to 76 (two-day) and 84 (all)
observations. 11 Table 2 reports separately the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 74 sub-sample studies of announcements of convertible bond and 10 studies of warrantbonds. Overall, the studies include a total of 6,310 company announcements with 5,618
and 692 for convertibles and warrant-bonds, respectively.
[Please Insert Table 2 here]
For convertibles, the mean CAR across 74 observations is -1.14% (significantly different from zero at the 1%-level). While the range of CARs is quite large (-8.27% to +2.37%), the close proximity between mean and median suggests that outliers are not a major issue in the measure of central tendency. The mean CAR across 10 warrant-bond studies ranges between -1.59% and +1.41% with a non-significant overall mean of -0.02%. The difference between overall means for convertibles and warrant bonds is statistically significant (5%-level); the distributional difference is confirmed (at the 5%-level) using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum/Mann-Whitney test. In other words, there is univariate evidence confirming a more negative wealth impact of announcing the intention to issue 10 In eight sub-samples the measures were over a 3 day event window (-1, 1), in two over just the one announcement day (0), and in one for a four day window (-2, 1).
11 One very small (n = 4) sub-sample with CAR = -8.27% was identified as an outlier during the CAR-based regression diagnostic tests, so is excluded from the CAR regressions; however, it is included in the t-statisticbased regressions.
convertibles than warrant-bonds, consistent with the theoretical arguments in Section 3 above.
The multivariate regression results are shown in Table 3 . The expected sign column in the table identifies the expected sign for the coefficients, based on the discussion in Section 3.
Models 1 through 3 are based on mean CAR as the dependent variable. Models 4 to 6 report results for the same models, but with the t-statistics of the mean CARs as the dependent variable. The models provide reasonable explanatory power, with adjusted R 2 ranging between 19% and 37%, and averaging 29% across the 6 models. Multicollinearity is a relatively minor issue with estimated variance inflation factors (VIFs) within the 1-3 range.
[Please Insert Table 3 here]
Model 1 is a simple OLS regression based on studies reporting 2 day event window mean
CARs. In this model, four variables are statistically significant factors in determining reported wealth effects: CB vs. WB, United States, Refund, and SSCI. The coefficient on CB vs. WB suggests that announcements of convertibles suffer a larger negative wealth effect (-0.67%) than warrant-bonds. This result is significant at the 5%-level. The coefficient for US studies is significant at the 1%-level and is also large in economic terms:
the wealth effect of US hybrid securities is 1.11% lower than that of hybrid securities issues outside the US. The coefficient on Refund is significantly negative (at the 5%-level).
The result suggests that issuing hybrid securities to repay debt is not favoured by market participants;: the effect is -1.62%. Perhaps the market views the non-replacement of debt with further debt as an indication of the lack of confidence, or even desperation by managers of the issuing firm. Studies published in SSCI journals tend to have a positive wealth effect bias; perhaps more positive announcement effects are considered more interesting given the underlying expectation of a negative effect, leading to publication in relatively prestigious journals.
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A large number of factors have non-significant coefficients including the equity-like or mixed-like characteristics of convertibles, bond rating, whether funds are used for capital expenditures, rights issues, and non-US market. 13 These results suggest that the withinsample evidence from prior research on such issues does not appear to be robust when other factors are taken into account within our between-study analysis. Absent further, more robust, evidence we must assume that they do not have a major impact on announcement wealth effects. The second issue with the results in Column (1) is that the individual observations used in the meta-analysis involve overlapping samples. For example, our study includes several papers using US data. These studies are likely to use the same hybrid debt announcements for at least part of their samples. Further, in several cases, the same data is used by the original authors to test different hypotheses (e.g. firm size, credit rating, etc.) and these are included as separate observations in our regression. Datta et al. (1992, 73) argue that this issue does not represent a problem in their study: "Although the population of acquisitions from which the studies have drawn their samples is finite, the sampling criteria are so different that observations are treated as being independent of one another. Similarly, while multiple observations from the same study have been used, they represent wealth estimates from samples unrelated to each other". These arguments are not entirely convincing, for our context at least, so we also include an adjustment for overlapping samples as a robustness check in Column (2) of Table 3 . We follow Nelson and Kennedy (2009, 355) who argue that if a study has two sets of results counting in the meta-analysis (e.g. the same data is used for a size comparison and a rating comparison) the results for each set should be weighted by one half in a weighted least squares regression. Column (2) includes this analysis, but in addition we apply the same logic to 'countries', which is especially important for the US. We estimate the total number of unique observations (separately for CBs and WBs) based on tables of sample sizes per calendar year reported in various studies (taking the largest yearly sample reported). Comparing the total number of unique observations with the total number of overlapping observations provides a scaling down factor per country that is used for all potentially overlapping studies, scaled down again if multiple results from one study are used on the meta-analysis. 15 The overall effect of this is only to include the 'evidence' from the unique observations. The results in Column (2) are very similar to those in Column (1). The same four variables are significant, but the exact sizes of the coefficients and the significance levels are slightly different.
In Column (3) we include all the studies that are represented in Column (1) and in addition we include studies that only present event period results for other than 2-day event windows. Therefore, the number of observations for Column (3) goes up to 83 (from 75 in the first two columns); we revert to simple OLS estimation as in Column (1). The incorporation of event studies that only report other than 2-day windows allows us to also study the variable for firm size. The results in Column (3) are virtually identical to those in Column (1) except that the significance levels are slightly higher. The coefficient for firm size is positive, but not significant.
As suggested above, an important issue in the simple OLS regressions is that each observation is accorded equal weight, whereas the reliability of the mean CARs varies quite considerably. Reliability depends on the sample size and variability in observed company CARs within the original study. Sample sizes differ greatly (between 4 and 561) and variability will differ across studies in different time periods and countries. An alternative measure that considers reliability is the t-statistic (or Z-statistic) derived from each study's mean CAR and its standard error. We use this measure as an alternative proxy for wealth effect using all sub-samples for which the measure can be derived; this restriction reduces the sample size somewhat to 60 (two-day) and 67 (all) observations. This analysis, which is included in Columns (4) to (6), provides a check that the CARbased results are not being biased by small-sample studies.
The results in Columns (4) to (6) are strongly in line with those in Columns (1) to (3). The coefficients for CB vs. WB, United States, and SSCI have the same sign and have comparable significance levels. The non-significant coefficients also remain nonsignificant. The only exception is the Refund variable. The sign for this variable is the same (negative). However, it is no longer significant and the t-statistics are very far from any significance level (between 0.12 and 0.27). This result probably means that the evidence on this variable presented in the first three columns must be viewed with some caution as it may be based on small sub-sample studies.
Discussion of the results, conclusions, and future research directions
This paper presents the results from a meta-analysis of 6,310 company announcements of convertible bonds and warrant-bonds, contained in 84 reported sub-samples from 35 studies. The result that stands out in this study is that hybrid debt announcements by US firms are associated with larger negative abnormal returns than those announced by companies in other countries, even market-oriented ones. 16 A possible explanation for this result is that companies in the US are more widely held than those in other countries, where ownership is less dispersed. This difference may lead to US companies facing a larger information asymmetry between managers and investors compared to companies in other countries. This information asymmetry possibly translates itself in more negative abnormal returns. However, more analysis is needed to confirm whether the difference in abnormal returns is really driven by differences in information asymmetry.
A second interesting result is that we confirm evidence of a significant difference between abnormal returns associated with announcements of convertible bonds and of warrantbonds. Both univariate and multivariate analysis suggest that warrant-bonds show no 16 The significant difference between US and Network-oriented countries is evident as the coefficient on US in the models presented within Table 3 , as Network-oriented countries is the comparator (omitted) variable.
Recasting the models with Non-US market as the comparator (omitted) variable enables a statistical test of the difference between US and non-US market. This shows that the latter difference is significant at the 10%, 10%, 5% levels in the CAR-based Models (1), (2), and (3), respectively but in the t-stat-based Models (4) through (6) the difference is negative but not significant.
significant negative wealth effect, on average, in direct contrast to the mean -1.1% for convertibles. This result is consistent with theoretical expectations. A company issuing warrant-bonds has more flexibility than a company issuing convertible bonds. With a convertible bond, the bond disappears when the conversion right is exercised. This is not necessarily the case with a warrant-bond where it is possible to specify a different maturity for the bond and the warrants. Another potential advantage of warrant-bonds is that investors can separately trade the bonds and the warrants. This creates a benefit for the investor, while there is no obvious disadvantage to the issuing company. In light of this, it is perhaps surprising that, in recent years, warrant-bond issues seem to have virtually disappeared in practice.
Third, issuing hybrid securities to refund debt is not favoured by investors, which we speculate might result from a signalling effect. Failure to replace debt with further debt may suggest problems in banking relationships or perhaps even financial distress.
Finally, the lack of significant effects for several factors found to be important withinsample in prior research also suggests that more work is needed before we can claim to understand the wealth effects of hybrid securities. Such work might usefully encompass improvements in theory, in application of improved models (e.g. recognising and controlling for selection bias when comparing convertibles with warrant-bonds) and also in evidence from further study replications in different institutional environments. De Jong et al. (2011) study issuance day effects for these announcements and they find that the abnormal return for the combination (0.32%) is significantly higher than for the separate issues of convertible bonds (-3.37%). We are more interested in the announcement day effect. De Jong et al. (2011) state that the announcement and issuance dates coincide for more than 90% of their sample. However, to make results completely comparable, we would like to know the exact announcement effect.
are different in terms of capital structure, because they tend to be more strongly levered.
The only study that explicitly includes financial companies is the paper by Janjigian (1987) . It is interesting to explicitly study convertible bond issues by financial companies and see if the announcement returns are different from those of industrial companies and utilities. Finally, our sample includes studies that were in the public domain on August 31, 2010 or before. More recently, a number of papers have studied the effect of convertible arbitrage by hedge funds. These funds buy newly-issued convertible bonds and at the same time short underlying shares. It is possible that this shorting of shares has a negative impact on the stock price, possibly already at the announcement date. It would be interesting to study this effect. For that purpose more recent samples than those summarized in this paper are necessary, because hedge fund involvement only increased from approximately the year 2000 (see, e.g. Brown, Lewis, Grundy, and Verwijmeren, 2012) . A related topic is the influence of the recent financial crisis. During this period, the influence of hedge funds decreased. At the same time convertible bonds became popular with companies that had troubles attracting either straight debt or equity.
Even though a relatively large number of papers have studied announcements of convertible bond and warrant-bond issues, there seem to be enough topics left for an exciting research agenda. We look forward to seeing the results of these future studies. A two-sample t-test confirms that the mean CAR% for convertibles is significantly lower (more negative) than for warrant-bonds, at the 5%-level (t = 2.11). The equivalent nonparametric test (Wilcoxon rank-sum/Mann-Whitney) confirms that the distributions differ at the 5%-level (Z = 2.31; p = 0.02) Notes: Models (1) and (4) are unweighted OLS regressions based on studies reporting 2 day event window mean CARs and tstatistics, respectively. Models (2) and (5) are Weighted Least Squares regressions based on 2 day event window mean CARs and t-statistics, respectively. The weights are square-root (adjusted sample size), where each observation sample size is adjusted to reflect overlapping observations within countries and also within a single research study. Models (3) and (6) are unweighted OLS regressions based on all studies mean CARs and t-statistics, respectively. The independent variables are: CB vs. WB (= 1 for convertibles; = 0 for warrant-bonds), Mixed-like (= 1 for convertibles that are not identified as equity-like or debt-like in the original paper), Equity-like (= 1 for convertibles that are defined as equitylike in the original paper), the omitted dummy is for Debt-like convertibles; Non-US Market (studies based on data from UK, Canada and Australia), United States (studies based on US data), the omitted variable is network-oriented countries (studies using data from all other countries); Rights (= 1 if rights issue), Refund (= 1 if hybrid used to refund debt), Capital expenditure (= 1 if hybrid used to finance capital expenditure), Rating (= 1 for higher Moody's rating), Size (= 1 for companies that are in the top half of large companies in the original paper), Industrial, and SSCI (= 1 if study published in the Social Science Citation Index journal list for 2008). Table reports coefficients (with t-statistics in parentheses). The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test indicates heteroskedasticity in the CAR-based models (1), (2) and (3) but not for models (4), (5) and (6) so Huber-White adjusted tstatistics are used for models (1), (2) and (3) only. *** significant at the 1%-level, ** significant at the 5%-level, * significant at the 10%-level (2-tail tests).
